Jensen (2003)Patriots, Settlers and the Origins of American Social Policy,

Jensen (2003) analyzes the development of entitlements through a historical institutionalist lens. She shows how the policies have developed as a result of path dependency; path dependency is the idea that once a policy has been established, we maintain the original direction, or atleast for certain do not go back, because the further along a path we go, the more costs we will incur if we turn around. Jensen (2003) explores the origins of entitlements, and what factors in the early years of establishment of our coutry led entitlements to become defined as they are, today. Entitlements are policy driven non-discretionary commitments to individuals from the government. They are government instruments which, it could be argued, accrue less to the recipient than to the national government. The entitlements of the early 1800's were awarded to "certain categories of Americans who served the purposes of the state as it sought to claim, protect, and expand its sovereignty over an immense portion of the North American continent" (Jensen 205). Entitlements led to nation building and the centralization of the federal government. The Pension Act of 1818 and the Homestead Act are 2 examples of entitlements which were instigated the early part of the 18th century as a means for governmental expansion, on their terms. These entitlements benefited white, male Americans; these same citizens helped to solidify the goals early american governance sought to meet. Today, in the United States, entitlements are still geared more towards men, where as what we would call “welfare policy” is more for minorities and women. Jensen’s analysis is a clear description of how the different perceptions of social policy were contrived in America.

Peters, Pierre, King (2005). The Politics of Path Dependency: Political Conflict in Historical Institutionalism.

critique of historical institutionalism:
Punctucated Equilibrium is no good; it ignored incremental changes and 'losing' policy ideas that caused a conflict, but were not victorious, and therefore did not make a visible, such as policy or structutal change, impact. It puts on rose colored classes, glossing over underlying conflicts that dont make themselves manifest as results.

By looking at policy formation as Kuhn describes paradigms (as big shifts) it over simplifies the process and is incomplete.

Four shortcomings of historical Institutionalism:
1. HI conceptualized change in terms of MAJOR events, and ignored incremental changes; smaller changes are defined away in HI, even if they ultimately lead to something significant (1277).
2. "Retrospective Rationality." HI identifies choisen policy options as logical and rational- complexities and uncertainities in policy formation are not shown; inlt the victorious policy recieves attention.. and when in does, in retrospect, it is seems as the obvious choice... even if there was debate, conflict and an opposition.
3. HI does not properly conceptualize or acct for political conflict; there is more political conflict... HI does not identify it all.
4. HI cannot explain political or policy change. Punctuated equilibrium is not adequet. "The focus on structires over action, on fixity over change, is not conducive to accounting for political change" (1278).

Thelen (1999). Historical Institutionalis in Comparative Politics.

Historical institutionalism:
Analyzes organizational and institutional configurations. Others look at particular settings in isolation.
Pays attention to critical junctures and long term processes. Others look at a slice of time or a short term maneuver.

"researching important issues this way, historical institutionalism make visible and understandable the overreaching contexts and interacting processes that shape and reshape states, politics, and public policy making" (katznelson and milner, 693).

Historical Institutionalism: hypothesizes about combined effects of institutions and processes rather than one institution at a time.
1. substantive agenda
2. temporal arguments
3. attentionto contexts and configurations

differences between rat choice and h.i.:
Rational Choice:focus on the coordinating functions of institutions... as generating or maintaining equilibrium.
H.I.:institutions emerge from and are embedded in concrete temporal processes; cases unified in space and time, i.e. transformation to democracy.
Differences in hypothesis forming:
H.I.: begins with empirical puzzle.
R.C.: derive puzzles from observing odd behavior.; uses counterfactuals (things running against norms, or expected behaviors).
Differences in PREFERENCE FORMATION:
H.I.: endogenous (growing within)
R.C.: exogenous (derived outside the body)
View of institutons:
H.I.: start with institutions and ask how they effect individual behavior (they have a historical view of institutions)
R.C.: starts with individuals and asks where institutions came from (functionalist view of institutions). institutions have a coordinating function! institutions sustain equilibrium.

RATIONAL CHOICE MAJOR CONCERNS:
why rational actors create inefficient collective outcomes
why is one equilibrium and not another reached

HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS:
institutions cannot be understood in isolation from the political and social setting in when they are embedded (384)
institutions compete

PATH DEPENDENCY:
from wikipedia: In perhaps a related vein, scholars such as Kathleen Thelen caution that the historical determinism embedded in path-dependent frameworks ignore the constant renegotiation of institutional configurations. She suggests that institutions undergo moments of institutional evolution wherein key actors renegotiate the configuration and purpose of said institutions.
critical juncture from wikipedia: David Collier in political science. In the critical juncture framework, antecedent conditions define and delimit agency during a critical juncture in which actors make contingent choices that set a specific trajectory of institutional development and consolidation that is difficult to reverse. This is akin to the concepts of lock-in or positive feedback derived from path dependence in economics...

Lieberman (2002). Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change.

Institutionalist and Ideological approaches are both limited.

There is too much emphasis on order... there is no way to explain episodic changes?

We need to incorperate both into a theory. Institutions and ideas alone cannot explain major political changes... but together, an explanation can arise. "analysis that takes both ideas and and institutions seriously will almost of necessity she light on points of friction, irregularities, and discontinuities that drive political change" (Lieberman 2002, 698).

March and Olsen (1984). The New Institutionalism: Organization Factors in Political Life.

James March and Johan Olsenreductionism: the macro consequences of micro behavior. "the behavior of an organization is the consequence of the interlocking choices by individuals and firms, each acting in terms of expectations and preferences manifested at those levels" (736).Ulititarianism: Action as the making of calculated decisions. Actions as the product of calculated self-interest (not a response to duty).Functionalism: The efficiency of history. Instrumentalism: the primacy of outcomes (737).Institutionalist Perspective: institutions are atonomous, political actors, which influence society... as opposed to the view that society soley affects institutions.

Stigler (1972). The Theory of Economic Regulation.

George Stigler
Companies seek regulations to make themselves richer. Regulations limit entry, allowing them to keep prices high and discourage rent seeking (rent seeking: grabbing a share of the public treasure chest).

Stone (2002). Policy Paradox.

Deborah StoneChapter 1the polis and the marketthe polis: cooperation; the market: competitionthe polis: loyalties; the market: no "glue"the polis: groups/orgs; the market: individualsthe polis: inperfect information/interpretation; the market: perfect informationthe polis: the law of passion; the market: laws of matter (finate, scarce, consumed...otherwise collective good)the polis: exchange ideas; the market: exchange goodsthe polis: public interest; the market: public interestChapter 2equity"who gets what, when and how?"distribution is at the heart of political conflict. example: dividing up a cake; what is considered equal an equal distribution? Approaches to distributive justice: Rawls and NozickNozick: Anarchy, State and Utopia. "distrivution is just of it came about by a voluntary and fair process (53)."Rawls: A Theory of Justice. "veil of ignorance." end-result concept.In Policy Paradox, Stone presents two views on the distribution of equity; a Rawlsian view and that of Robert Nozick. Nozick argues that “a distribution is just if it came about by a voluntary and fair process” (Stone 2002, 53). In Theory, an unequal distribution could be judged as being a fair distribution due to the fairness of the process. A different view is more Rawlsian and Nozick calls it the end-result concept. In the end result concept “in order to judge whether a distribution is fair, we look only at the end result and do not need any historical information as to how the distribution came about” (Stone 2002, 54). Inevitably, “people who hold an end result view of equity are more likely to favor direct redistribution” (Stone 2002, 55) if it means the end-result would be an equal distribution. Nozick would not favor direct redistribution.My question is why would Nozick not favor a direct redistribution if the final result would be equity? Why would the process matter more than the end result?Nozick’s theory assumes that just actions yield just outcomes. But this is not always the case. The example given in Stone (2002) was the issue of slavery in the 1800’s. When considering slavery, the end-result, someone is forced to be a slave, in an inequality. But, if considering the process and that slave owners acquired their “property” fairly, men being forced into slavery, is fair. As Stone states more eloquently, “slaveholders and married men acquired their property fair and square, according to the law. So proponents of process concepts are left with the problem of where to find independent standards for judging distributive processes” (Stone 2002, 55). Another example is equal pay for men and women. Earlier in the century, the process that determined that men and women should not be paid the same amount was considered fair; men had a family to provide for and thus should be paid more money for the same job. In the case of equal pay for men and women a ‘fair’ process produced unequal results. In Nozick’s theory, the process is what matters and whatever results is equity, even if it determines men and women should not be paid the same for the same job.After a lot of thought I determined when the process might matter more, as Nozick attests: the distribution of wealth. At its simplest definition, the end result concept would see the distribution of wealth in the United States as unequal, and might purpose redistribution. Nozick, on the other hand, would look at other factors, such as why there is the inequality, and perhaps make suggestions or create opportunities that would allow for others to join those who make more money. These two different views are, as Stone suggested, socialist and capitalist.Yet I am still a skeptic. Although the book goes into detail about the trouble of defining fairness, I am curious about the definition of equality. As Rawls’s theory addresses, a society can decide what equality means; more income can be awarded to doctors or teachers so that if the end result produces differences in wealth among occupations it is still considered equal because of the decision that were previously made. As the book points out, “end result justice does not require the same amount of money for everyone or the same size winter coat…” (Stone 2002, 58). Redistribution policy merely ensures that everyone has the minimum necessary for survival; it does not propose taking away the doctor’s mansion so that he and the junky can each live in a duplex. . But trouble then arises from this solution as this subjective decision of equality is made from behind a veil, a condition not likely to be manufactured. Yet, I am still unconvinced, and my question still remains: why is the process more important? As I stated in the beginning, an equal process does not always elicit equal results; for this reason, if given an ultimatum, I would choose the end result concept of equity.